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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes whether ideology-driven firms doing business based on
ethical principles such as those envisioned by fair trade can survive in themarket
whencompetition increases. By formally evaluating thedevelopmentof fair trade
over time, we show that such firms cannot continue to exist with full compliance
with ethical standards about fairness. We conceptualize fairness as wealth trans-
fers to small local producers in developing countries and apply aHotelling-model
of horizontal competition in fairness. Results show that increasing the scale and
scope of fair trade products in the market implies that concessions on fairness
are needed to survive intensified competition. Ideology-driven fair trade firms
will survive only if they differentiate. In the end, paradoxically, wealth transfers
by ideology-driven firms can be upheld only by focusing on other attributes than
fairness to attract consumers. Only then can ideology-driven firmsmaintain ethi-
cal standards in amarket environment, while alleviating pressure on total wealth
transfers to local producers.
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1. Introduction
The age-old question whether economic principles can go hand in hand with
ethical principles has become ever more urgent now ethical standards are
becoming increasingly important in modern Western markets. Whether it be
the purchasing of chocolate for private consumption, the importing of wood
for further processing, or the selling of clothes in large department stores,
Western consumers and businesses are expected to base their decisions on
ethical principles as well (UN 2017). The establishment and implementation
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of ethical standards in the market has typically been initiated by small, often
ideologically inspired non-profit organizations focusing on issues such as the
environment, poor working conditions in sweatshops, and the income of sub-
sistence farmers in low-income countries. Recently, ethical standards have
been strategically implemented in the businesses of larger (multinational)
firms as well, increasing the impact such standards could have (Hockerts and
Wüstenhagen2010, Fransen2012, Lutz 2012). For example, since Starbucks has
been involved in fair trade standards,more coffee farmers could profit from the
benefits of fair trade.
However, the impact of implementing ethical standards by businesses
becomes questionable as soon as concessions have to be made regarding
(full) compliance. Compliancewith ethical standards is often costly and creates
tension with other business motives, such as profit maximization (Raynolds
2009, Jaffee and Howard 2010). Whereas non-profit firms, ideologically, often
fully comply with ethical standards to increase impact for their (marginalized)
stakeholders or issue, for-profit firms may (have to) prioritize the increase of
sales over ethical principles. For example, when the ideologically founded Ben
& Jerry’s was taken over by Unilever, a different way of doing business was
implemented (Fast Company 2017). Furthermore, once for-profit firms also
start complying with ethical standards, the mainly ideology-driven actors of
the first hour may have to reconsider their set of ethical principles, because
they risk losing customers. More products supplied according to ethical stan-
dards results in more competition on this product attribute, possibly lowering
the total impact of these standards (Jaffee and Howard 2010, Fransen 2012).
Finally, if competition results in less impact, this erodes the fairness and legiti-
macy of ethical standards in consumermarkets, affecting the shelf life of ethical
standards and the initiatives embodying those (Reinecke et al. 2012, Marston
2013, Doherty et al. 2015).
We analyze how the integration of ethical standards in conventional busi-
ness strategies affects the compliance with ethical standards in product
markets in the context of fair trade. Fair trade has successfully created eth-
ical business standards, envisaging economic exchanges based on fairness
principles (Fairtrade 2014). This makes fair trade a prime example of the phe-
nomenon that in markets ethical principles and economic behavior can go
hand in hand. One of the ethical standards of fair trade concerns transfer-
ring wealth to small local producers (‘smallholders’) in developing countries
by means of a guaranteed higher (world) market price (Hayes 2006, McArdle
and Thomas 2012, Fairtrade 2014). On top, smallholder cooperatives are paid
pricepremiums to support developmentprojects suchas education andhealth
care. These above-market price payments are facilitated by (mainly) Western
consumers paying higher prices for comparable products (e.g. De Pelsmacker
et al. 2005). Whereas originally fair trade products used to be sold exclusively
by ideology-driven alternative trade organizations (ATOs), nowadays fair trade
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products are being sold through conventional, profit-maximizing distribution
channels as well, making it a mainstream phenomenon. Fair trade certifica-
tion has played a major role in this respect (Littrell and Dickson 1999, Reed
2009, Doherty et al. 2013). This mainstreaming of fair trade could enhance
payments to smallholders, but these payments could also be reduced as a
result of increased competitionbetween firmsholdingdifferent conceptionsof
fairness (Raynolds 2009, Bezençon2011). Fair trade’s strictest (andmore expen-
sive) ethical standards may be lowered or may disappear altogether when the
ideology-driven firms adhering to these standards are unable to compete with
for-profit entrants (Low and Davenport 2006, Raynolds 2009, Doherty et al.
2013). This is problematic because ideology-driven firms, such as ATOs, are
regarded as pivotal for conveying fair trade’s message on fairness principles
(e.g. Leclair 2002, Mohan 2009, Bezençon 2011). Furthermore, lower compli-
ance with fair trade’s ethical standards (i.e. ‘dilution’) could undermine fair
trade’s legitimacy (Jaffee and Howard 2010, 2016).
Our research question is whether ideology-driven firms can maintain the
same level of fairness (in terms of compliance with ethical standards) when
they are forced to compete with firms that apply a much less strict concept of
fairness. In doing so, we will be able to shed light on various questions about
the future of fair trade. Can ATOs, as ideology-driven firms, continue to survive
in their current form and with their current products? Will fair trade products
represent the same fairness in terms of compliancewith ethical standards after
competition has increased? Or are concessions regarding fairness necessary to
surmount the increased competition in the market for fair trade products?
To analyze the consequences in the fair trade market of the confrontation
between full compliance with ethical standards and profit creation, we apply
a Hotelling model of competition (Hotelling 1929, D’Aspremont et al. 1979) in
which firms compete on fairness. We define fairness as the amount of wealth
transfers to small local producers in developing countries.1 In themodel, firms
choose optimal levels of fairness taking into account consumer preferences,
costs of compliance with fairness standards, and the fairness level of its com-
petitor. Our model thus incorporates the importance of interactions between
consumer preferences, firms’ compliance costs, and competition, highlight-
ing the dilemmas regarding compliance with fairness standards and profit
creation over time.
The model’s application relates firms’ wealth transfers to particular market
circumstances by considering four distinct historical phases of mainstream-
ing fair trade (see Figure 1). We motivate the four phases in detail in the next
1 Clearly, fairness in fair trade comprises much more than a quantitative ‘wealth transfer of money’. In line
with the (original) fair trade concept focusing on payments of above market prices, fair trade ﬁrms also
support smallholders by oﬀering technology and knowledge (typically through the smallholder coopera-
tives). Another important feature of fair trade consists ofmaintaining equal relationships.Wealth transfers
should therefore be seen as the quality of the trade relationships.
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Figure 1. The diﬀerent phases of the process of mainstreaming FT. Based on: Davies
(2007), Doherty et al. (2013), Nicholls and Opal (2005), and Raynolds (2009).
section, noting here that these phases mark the transition from fair trade as
a charity movement in the 1950s to the current phenomenon with for-profit
and not-for-profit fair trade firms competing formarket share. For each phase’s
competitive situation we determine fair trade firms’ optimal location on the
fairness spectrum, making inferences on the subsequent effect of competition
onwealth transfers over time. Our historical account thus facilitates an analysis
of the consequences of mainstreaming fair trade in a broader context, specif-
ically the discussion on the survival of ATOs and compliance with fair trade
standards in a market environment.
Our findings indicate that until the labeling phase the effect of mainstream-
ing on wealth transfers is positive, despite increased competition. In the main-
stream phase, however, the effect on wealth transfers becomes less clear and
starts depending on how fair trade firms react to the increased competition.
Only if fair trade firms find ways to attract consumers by differentiating on
other attributes than fairness, wealth transfers could increase. Paradoxically,
to remain successful, fair trade firms should move away from promoting fair
trade’s ethical standards. These findings are consistent with findings from con-
sumer behavior literature. For instance, Obermiller et al. (2009) found that
when fair trade firms focus on products’ taste, consumerswill bemore eager to
choose the product. Specifically, 86% of their sample would then choose the
fair trade brand compared with 34% when the fair trade brand focused on the
product’s ethical aspect.
Our paper contributes to the literature threefold. First, we add to the
literature debating fair trade’s fairness by studying an important aspect of
competition which has been largely ignored in this literature: the effect
of the (Western) battle for market shares. According to evolutionary eco-
nomics, competition requires adequate responses to survive in changed mar-
ket environments (Alchian 1950). In that vein, we analyze the survival of
ideology-driven firms such as ATOs (Littrell and Dickson 1999, Leclair 2002,
Ingenbleek and Reinders 2013) and the weakening of fair trade standards
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during mainstreaming (Raynolds 2009, Jaffee and Howard 2010, 2016). A dis-
appearance of ideology-driven firms will not only affect fair trade’s fairness,
it will also affect the compliance of profit-maximizing firms with fair trade
standards (Raynolds 2009, Bezençon 2011). We show that competition may
negatively affect fair trade standard compliance over time, though in the end
innovation and efficiency could imply increased benefits to (more) fair trade
producers nonetheless. Moreover, ideology-driven firms such as ATOs can sur-
vive only if they start to differentiate on other product features than product
fairness (e.g. Obermiller et al. 2009). In doing so, we also contribute to gen-
eral criticisms on the current imbalances between Western and non-Western
countries in fair trade (Hira and Ferrie 2006, Bacon 2010, Bezençon 2011). Such
imbalances are likely to be aggravated when total wealth transfers are under
pressure.
Second, the fair trade literature has identified and focused on studying
different conceptualizations of fair trade’s fairness, obstructing a straightfor-
ward comparison over time (Bezençon 2011, Ingenbleek and Reinders 2013,
Doherty et al. 2015). Introducing one metric for fairness – wealth transfers –
in a formal, integrated framework resolves this problem. Our framework facil-
itates the consistent comparison of distinct, historically relevant phases of fair
trade mainstreaming and allows for an explicit assessment of how competi-
tion changes compliance with fairness standards over time. By analyzing the
effects of combining ethical principles with profit-maximizing behavior, our
framework sheds new light on the rising tensions between rational economic
behavior and application of ethical standards. As such, our analysis may help
understand why so many different strategies have appeared in sustainability-
oriented markets such as fair trade (e.g. cf. Overdevest 2010, Reinecke et al.
2012, Doherty et al. 2015).
Third, by considering the relationship between competition in Western fair
trade markets and compliance with ethical standards, we highlight a mech-
anism through which smallholders could be affected other than through fair
trade efficiency (Hayes 2006, Wilson 2010, Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016) or the
local roleof fair tradeorganizations (Samuel etal. 2014).Our analysis shows that
the effects of competition are highly relevant for ‘standards markets’ dynam-
ics (Mohan 2009, Raynolds 2009, Reinecke et al. 2012). As such, our framework
has also merit for understanding developments in other markets where ethi-
cal standards and competition interact (e.g. Hockerts and Wüstenhagen 2010,
Overdevest 2010). Furthermore, our analysis illustrates the process of ‘com-
moditization’, which shows that competition enforces firms to search for dif-
ferentiation strategies (Reimann et al. 2010, Marston 2013), focusing on taste
and/or quality rather than ethical principles (Obermiller et al. 2009, Bezençon
and Blili 2011).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide the histor-
ical background of fair trade for our model. Section 3 explains our modeling
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framework for analyzing competition and fairness. Section 4 analyzes and
compares wealth transfers across the different phases of mainstreaming fair
trade. Section 5 discusses our results, highlighting the changed role of firms
and consumers, and includes issues for further research.
2. Historical background of fair trademainstreaming
In this section, we delineate the history of fair trade in view of different per-
spectives on and manifestations of fairness. We first explain that two rival-
ing perspectives on fairness have emerged and characterize the key debates
regarding fair trademainstreaming. Then, we distinguish four historical phases
describing how fair trade mainstreaming has occurred and how the oper-
ationalization of fairness has changed over time. From this background,
we conclude that the different operationalizations of fairness can be styl-
ized into one metric: wealth transfers, which is at the core of the model in
Section 3.
Fair trade is a form of ethical trade based on two competing perspectives
on fairness (Maseland and De Vaal 2002, Walton 2010). The first perspective is
held by ideology-driven organizations such as Alternative Trade Organizations
(ATOs), i.e. suppliers fully committed to ethical principles. ATOs typically aim
at maintaining direct trade relationships with local producers and at offering
fair trade products only (Raynolds 2009). The second perspective is held by a
wide array of market actors that use fair trade-certification programs in their
production processes and/or product assortment (Moore 2004, Doherty et al.
2013, 2015, Marston 2013). This group of suppliers has a profit-driven business
strategy, starting their involvement with fair trade when fair trade labels were
introduced. For the latter, fair trade is a product feature and not a business aim
(Raynolds 2009).
These two different perspectives feed ongoing discussions about, among
other things, fair trade’s efficacy and fairness in providing wealth transfers
to fair trade’s main beneficiaries: the local producers (Raynolds 2009, Wilson
2010, McArdle and Thomas 2012, Doherty et al. 2013, Bassett 2014, Jaffee
2014, Hilson et al. 2016). Key issues in the debate regard provision of a fair
share of product prices and whether Western organizations rightfully address
smallholder needs, criticizing fair trade as a system (Raynolds 2009, Jaffee and
Howard 2010, Bezençon 2011, Doherty et al. 2015). Other issues relate to the
mainstreaming of fair trade, drawing particular attention to the question what
fairness is and for whom, and how fairness can be upheld when ideology-
driven fair trade firms must compete with for-profit firms (Maseland and De
Vaal 2002, Walton 2010, Jaffee and Howard 2016).
Importantly, competition between ideology-driven and for-profit firmsmay
imply thedisappearanceofATOs. For example, in TheNetherlands, thenumber
of ATOs (‘World Shops’) has decreased from 410 in 2001 to 344 in 2015 (Hebels
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2015), whereas sales from fair trade labels have increased, with most sales tak-
ing place in for-profit environments (FTI 2011, 2018). The disappearance of this
type of shops may imply that the original notion of fairness disappears (e.g.
Hira and Ferrie 2006, Mohan 2009, Bezençon 2011). Indeed, ATOs are impor-
tant for conveying fair trade’s message and identity (Mohan 2009) and, by
setting the strictest standards, are generally considered as a benchmark for
othermarket parties (e.g. Ingenbleek and Reinders 2013). Additionally, the full-
compliance of ATOs with their own strict principles may be under pressure
when competition arises with firms less willing to fully comply with fair trade
standards (Raynolds 2009, Jaffee andHoward 2010, 2016). In the battle formar-
ket shares, ATOs may be required to lower their standards, resulting in overall
lower product fairness.
Next to ATO survival, an important issue in the discussion on mainstream-
ing fair trade concerns ethical standard compliance, which affects the fairness
of fair trade-certified products offered on Western markets. Specifically, four
main debates are going on. First, fair trade-certification governance schemes
are accused of not allowing social movement participants and smallholders to
actively participate (Jaffee andHoward 2016). This is an important aspect as fair
trade principles are ideally co-constructed with the local producers to ensure
efficacy (Bezençon 2011,McArdle and Thomas 2012). Second, the involvement
of larger, multinational firms may imply that standards are lowered (Jaffee
2010). For instance, in the US the fair trade entry requirement of a mini-
mum purchase of 5% fair trade of total production was violated by Starbucks
buying <1% (McMurthy 2009, Jaffee 2010). Third, labeling multi-ingredient
products has led to a different version of fair trade labels on product pack-
ages, making fairness less visible and confusing for consumers (Lake Research
Patterns 2013 cited in Jaffee and Howard 2016). Finally, as multinationals
often source from plantations, a tension has emerged as larger plantations
are considered competitors for the original small-scale producers that already
face difficulties selling all harvest as fair trade-certified (see also Besky 2015,
FTI 2018).
We delineate the history of fair trade in view of the different perspectives on
fairness and the debates on fair trade mainstreaming. Particularly, we briefly
elaborate on the development of fair trade over time, distinguishing four
phases: charity, alternative, labeling, and mainstream. These are depicted in
Figure 1.2 Our brief account of the history of fair trade highlights the confronta-
tion of the two different perspectives on fairness.
2 These phases are based on our reading of the history of fair trade, see, for instance, Nicholls and Opal
(2005), Low and Davenport (2006), and Van Dam (2016). The exact timing of the four consecutive main-
streaming phases diﬀers across products and countries (Kocken 2003, Wheeler 2012). The years pointed
out are indicative for front running fair trade product markets, such as coﬀee, tea and chocolate in the
Netherlands.
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• Mainstreaming begins: the charity phase
The ‘charity phase’ starts after WWII when consumer groups and (mostly
religious) organizations started to trade directly with small producer groups,
supplying products to Western consumer markets on a small scale (Kocken
2003). For example, in 1946 the American organizations ‘Self Help Crafts’
started trading with poor Southern producer groups, and in Great Britain
Oxfam started to sell handicraft from Chinese refugees in their charity shops
(Kocken 2003). Fair trade’s concept of fairness3 was based on a moral duty to
help others, conveyed through product packages and sales environment (Lit-
trell and Dickson 1999, Nicholls and Opal 2005, Raynolds 2009, Reed 2009).
As such, markets for ethically traded products existed separately from con-
ventional product markets, i.e. two different segments existed. Conventional
market participants did not care about, or were not aware of small local pro-
ducers’ needs, in contrast to consumers and suppliers in small, but relatively
stable fair trade market segments. In these micro-segments, the involved fair
trade organizations ensured small-scale and direct relationships between local
producers and ideologicallymotivated consumers,which ensured that fairness
was front and center.
• In and against themarket: the alternative phase
In the ‘alternative phase’, starting in the 1960s, the exclusive focus on fair
trade micro-segments starts to fade away. Fair trade’s fairness was extended
with the idea of establishing an alternative international trade system, which
was clearly visible in fair trade sales environments (Kocken 2003, Reed 2009).
The main ATOs, World Shops, were established and became places for polit-
ical and economic discussions (Van Dam 2016). For example, Dutch World
Shops sold cane sugar with the message ‘by buying cane sugar you give peo-
ple in poor countries a place in the sun of prosperity’ (Kocken 2003, p. 1).
With World Shops in high streets, fair trade became available in outlets simi-
lar to conventional channels, resulting in higher awareness among the larger
public (Nicholls and Opal 2005, Raynolds 2009). However, conventional sup-
pliers remained disinterested in fair trade and competition hardly increased.
Both direct trade and the impact on the international political level defined fair
trade’s fairness. For instance, the campaign ‘Trade not Aid’ during the UNCTAD
conference in 1968 was seen as a big step (Kocken 2003).
• Trying tomake a distinction: the labeling phase
Both the goal of and degree of competition started to change when ethi-
cal – ‘fair trade’ – certification programs started to largely define the fair trade
3 In fact, ‘fair trade’ as we know today was called ‘alternative trade’, or ‘charity trade’. We regard these
markets however as ‘fair trade’ markets.
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movement in the ‘labeling phase’. Since the introduction of a fair trade label
in 1988, fair trade-certified products became increasingly available in conven-
tional distribution channels. For example, whereas the conventional Dutch
coffee sector was initially rather hostile towards fair trade, nowadaysmost cof-
fee roasters use fair trade-certification programs in their business strategies
(Mohan 2009, Reinecke et al. 2012). Higher sales and increased awareness of
conventional consumers and suppliers were the result (Kocken 2003, Low and
Davenport 2006, Davies 2007). In this phase, conventional suppliers started to
compete with ATOs’ products through labels. Fair trade labels introduced a
different practice of ethical trade and implied a different operationalization of
fairness. ATOs feared that the original fairness of ethical trademight be under-
mined by a focus on market share and increased (price) competition as well
as less ethical consumer and supplier awareness (Raynolds 2009, Balineau and
Dufeu 2010). Fair trade labels were heavily criticized by ATOs for being ‘in’, and
not ‘against’ the market, as they envisioned (Jaffee 2014).
• In andwith themarket: themainstream phase
Fair trade’s fairness became even obfuscated in themainstreamphase. Con-
sumers were confronted with several fair trade-certified labels in conventional
sales environments. Some conventional firms have become similar to alterna-
tive, 100% ideology-driven firms, whereas others decided to (also) introduce
an own fair trade label (e.g. Mohan 2009, Ingenbleek and Reinders 2013). For
example, Starbucks developed its own coffee certification program (CAFE),
while it also buys coffee from independent fair trade-certifiers. Such forms of
standard compliance were heavily debated and resulted, among other things,
in a schism in the US fair trade movement in 2011 (McMurthry 2009, Jaffee
and Howard 2010, 2016). In the mainstream phase, fair trade has become
fully integrated into conventional product markets and the initial segmen-
tation between the fair trade and conventional market has disappeared. In
wake of the increasing attention for fairness principles in product markets (UN
2017), competition may put pressure on the impact and legitimization of fair
trade’s fairness. Compromises to fair trade’s fairness in terms of compliance
with its ethical standards may be the result (Jaffee 2010, Jaffee and Howard
2010, 2016).
To conclude, both the extant debates and the historical phases show that
the fairness of fair trade is multifaceted and complex. Fair trade’s fairness
regards market operationalizations directly related to its ideology. As these
operationalizations change over time, irrevocably also the concept of fairness
changes. As such, fairness is to be understood and studied in its historical con-
text: fairness in the charity phase differs from fairness in themainstreamphase.
We assert that competition changes the context and type of wealth transfers
(fairness), resulting in fairness obtaining anothermeaning. To understand how
10 E. DE GELDER ET AL.
market competition changes the different aspects of fairness, we stylize fair-
ness into a single metric: wealth transfers. Our metric captures the different
aspects shaping the fairness concept, allowing for a more general conception
andunderstandingof how the fairness of fair trade evolves over timeunder dif-
ferent market conditions. As such, our aim is to transcend the aforementioned
ideological differences (e.g. Bezençon 2011) and focus on one general notion
of fairness for fair trade’s producers, which is useful especially given the differ-
ent phases fair tradehasgone throughover timeand thedifferent perspectives
that have characterized fair trade.
3. Amodel on competition in fairness
Having elaborated upon the historical context of fair trade competition, in this
section,wedevelop an economicmodel showing the impact of including com-
pliancewith ethical standards (wealth transfers to smallholders) for each of the
four phases of mainstreaming fair trade. The modeling framework we apply
to model competition in fairness is the two-firm model of Hotelling (1929),
where we assume that two profit-maximizing firms operate on a horizontal
fairness continuum of unit-length, choosing a fairness position ai ∈ [0, 1]. One
firmoffers conventional products (indicatedby ct), and the other firmoffers fair
trade (FT) products (indicatedby ft).Wealth transfers to smallholders arepart of
the firm’s profits, with the firm’s location on the fairness continuum indicating
how much of the profits are transferred. We assume a linear relation between
the firm’s location a and wealth transfers to producers. Hence, ai = 0 implies
zero wealth transfers, ai = 1 means that the firm will transfer all of its profits,
and ai = 0.4 implies that 40% of the firm’s profits will be transferred. Market
shares are denoted by xi and prices by pi. Both firms face exogenously deter-
mined variable and fixed costs, denoted by c and F respectively, resulting in
profit functions of
πi = (pi − c)xi − F (i = ct, ft) (1)
On the demand side, we assume consumers have preferences regarding
the amount of wealth transfers (Konow 2003, De Pelsmacker et al. 2005). Con-
sumers are uniformly distributed along the fairness continuum, where their
location x ∈ [0, 1] defines a particular consumer’s preferred fairness location.
Consumers have inelastic unit demands, and the total market size is normal-
ized to one. Analogous to the Hotellingmodel consumers face a psychological
distance cost when buying a product that does not match their fairness pref-
erence. Whenever a consumer buys a product containing less wealth transfers
than preferred, psychological unit distance costs are tct > 0, whereas buying
a product containing more wealth transfers than preferred implies that the
consumer faces psychological unit distance costs tft > 0.4 In our analysis we
4 These subscripts coincide with the subscripts distinguishing the conventional ﬁrm from the FT ﬁrm. This
is not problematic, as long as the conventional ﬁrm positions itself to the left of the FT ﬁrm.
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focus on the case of symmetric distance costs tct = tft ≡ t > 0, verifying the
impact of asymmetric distance costs tct = tft whenever useful.
Consumers buy the product as long as the price pi plus psychological dis-
tance cost ti does not exceed their willingness to pay V . Consumer utility U of
buying a good
U(x) = V − pi − ti|(x − ai)| (i = ct, ft) (2)
must be nonnegative for a consumer to buy the good. The indifferent con-
sumer between two products in terms of utility is denoted by x∗. We assume
that consumers’ willingness to pay V is always sufficiently high to ensure that
the whole market is covered.
The consumer utility function and the particular competitive situation in the
market determine firms’ prices,market shares, and the amount ofwealth trans-
fers. In the remainderof this sectionweconsider theseoutcomes for eachof the
historical phases of FT mainstreaming. We assume perfect information: con-
sumers have correct perceptions regarding the firms’wealth transfers and their
own psychological distance costs (Becchetti et al. 2014); firms have correct per-
ceptions regarding consumers’ willingness to pay V . We denote total wealth
transfers by S and the conventional and FT firm’s wealth transfers by Sct and
Sft respectively. To minimize mathematical notation all derivations have been
relegated to the Appendix. An overview of all results of this section is given in
Table 1.
3.1. The charity phase
In the charity phase, the two firms are located at the extremes of the fairness
continuum. The conventional firm is located on the left-hand side extreme of
the market (act = 0), the FT firm is located on the right-hand side extreme
(aft = 1). Furthermore, the market is segmented in the charity phase: both
firms’ markets are strictly separated by a border of (un)awareness and/or
(dis)interest. Using x∗ to denote this border, the conventional market segment
is positioned at the left of x∗, covering consumers and firms that are not inter-
ested in the FT concept. The FT market segment is positioned at the right of
x∗, where consumers and firms buy and sell FT products out of ideological
reasons. This also established market shares: x∗ is the conventional firm’s mar-
ket share and 1 − x∗ is the FT firm’s market share, with the latter being small
in the charity phase (x∗ > 1 − x∗). In the charity phase, these market shares
are exogenously given, i.e. not determined by the indifferent consumer. This
implies that both firms can behave as a monopoly in their respective market
segments. We assume, however, that both firms set their market prices such
that their complete market segment is covered.
Figure 2 illustrates the market situation in the charity phase. In the con-
ventional market segment, both the firm and consumers are not interested
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Table 1. Characterization and results of mainstreaming fairtrade.
Symmetric t (tct = tft = t) Asymmetric t (tct = tft)
Charity Phase (1950 – end 1960s)
A segmented market exists, separated by a border of (un)awareness and (dis)interest in FT. One market
segment is served by a conventional ﬁrm, and a charity-driven segment is served by an FT ﬁrm. Speciﬁc
model features: two separated market segments with two ﬁrms acting as monopolies located at the
opposite extremes of the fairness continuum.
Market shares (exogenous)
(ct) : x∗
(ft) : 1 − x∗
(ct) : x∗
(ft) : 1 − x∗
Prices
p∗ct = V
p∗ft = V − (1 − x∗)t
p∗ct = V
p∗ft = V − (1 − x∗)tft
Proﬁts π∗ct = (V − c)x∗ − F π
∗
ct = (V − c)x∗ − F
π∗ft = (V − (1 − x∗)tft − c)
(1 − x∗) − F
Wealth transfers Schar = π∗ft = (V − (1 − x∗) Schar = π∗ft = (V − (1 − x∗)
t − c)(1 − x∗) − F tft − c)(1 − x∗) − F
Alternative Phase (end 1960s – 1988):
The border of unawareness disappears and the market becomes one, as World shops appear in high
streets. The FT ﬁrm is still ideologically driven as it aims at establishing an alternative trade system.
Speciﬁc model features: two duopolists with the location of both ﬁrms ﬁxed in their original positions.
Market shares x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2
x∗ = 13
(tct + 2tft)
(tct + tft)
1 − x∗ = 1
3
(2tct + tft)
(tct + tft)
Prices p∗ct = p∗ft = t + c
p∗ct =
1
3
(tct + 2tft) + c
p∗ft =
1
3
(2tct + tft) + c
Proﬁts π∗ct = π∗ft =
t
2
− F
π∗ct =
1
9
(tct + 2tft)2
(tct + tft)
− F
π∗ft =
1
9
(2tct + tft)2
(tct + tft)
− F
Wealth transfers Salter = π∗ft =
t
2
− F Salter = π∗ft =
1
9
(2tct + tft)2
(tct + tft)
− F
Labeling phase (1988–2011)
Using FT labels becomes the new strategy of FT ﬁrms, in order to reach a larger market potential. This
phase results in the ﬁrst conventional ﬁrm(s) (considering) supplying FT products. Speciﬁc model features:
two duopolists, with the conventional ﬁrmmoving on the fairness continuum to the position of the FT
ﬁrm.
Market shares x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2 x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2
Prices p∗ct = p∗ft = t + c p∗ct = p∗ft =
1
3
(2tct + tft) + c
Proﬁts π∗ct = π∗ft =
1
2
t − F π∗ct = π∗ft = 0
Wealth transfers Slabel = π∗ct + π∗ft = t − 2F Slabel = π∗ct + π∗ft
= 1
3
(2tct + tft) − 2F
(continued).
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Table 1. Continued.
Mainstream phase (2011 – now)
For strategic reasons also the FT ﬁrm decides to lower the amount of wealth transfers to (potentially)
increase market share. Eventually, both ﬁrms start supplying FT products from a location in the middle of
the fairness continuum, resulting in the start of commoditization. Speciﬁc model features: two duopolists,
both willing to move along the fairness continuum. Degree of product heterogeneity becomes
important.*
Market share x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2 x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2
Prices
-homogeneous p∗ct = p∗ft = c p∗ct = p∗ft = c
-heterogeneous p∗ct = p∗ft = t/2 + c p∗ct = tft/2 + c p∗ft = tct/2 + c
Proﬁts
-homogeneous π∗ct = π∗ft = 0 π∗ct = π∗ft = 0
-heterogeneous π∗ct = π∗ft =
t
4
− F π∗ct =
tft
4
− F π∗ft =
tct
4
− F
Wealth transfers
-homogeneous Smain = π∗ct + π∗ft = 0 Smain = π∗ct + π∗ft = 0
-heterogeneous Smain = π∗ct + π∗ft = t/4 − F Smain = π∗ct + π∗ft = (tct + tft)/8− F
*For reasons of comparison with the homogeneous product case, we assume that the ﬁrms locate halfway
the fairness continuum in heterogeneous productmarkets. This happens if ﬁrms diﬀerentiate to the same
degree, implying equal ti for both products.
Figure 2. Market situation in the charity phase.
in, or unaware of, FT products’ existence. Consequently, consumers in this
market segment do not face costs in buying products that do not contain
wealth transfers (tct = 0). Accordingly, the highest price the conventional
firm can ask is V ,5 yielding profits of (V − c)x∗ − F. The conventional firm
5 As conventional consumers are not interested in FT, a move of the conventional ﬁrm to the right will not
be proﬁtable. In such case, part of the proﬁts has to be transferred. Optimally, the conventional ﬁrm stays
in location a = 0, in contrast to a standard Hotelling setting (with positive and symmetric t) in which
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generates no wealth transfers. By contrast, the FT firm locates in aft = 1, ide-
ologically aiming at transferring all profits to smallholders: Sft = π∗ft . FT con-
sumers are not indifferent regarding wealth transfers though. With aft = 1, FT
consumers buy a product containing more wealth transfers than preferred,
inducing psychological distance costs of tft > 0. Assuming V to be the same
as for conventional consumers, the maximum price the FT firm can ask to
cover the entire market is p∗ft = V − (1 − x∗)tft and total wealth transfers are
(V − (1 − x∗)tft − c)(1 − x∗) − F.
3.2. The alternative phase
In the alternative phase, the border of unawareness and disinterest between
both market segments disappeared, resulting in one integrated market and
a duopolistic market situation. Yet, disinterest at the conventional firm’s side
and ideological reasons at the FT firm’s side prevented both firms frommaking
changes in the amount of wealth transfers they wanted to transfer (Nicholls
and Opal 2005). Hence, also in the alternative phase, the conventional firm
operates in act = 0, transferring zero wealth transfers, whereas the FT firm
remains operating in aft = 1, transferring the maximum amount of wealth
transfers.
On the consumer side, however, things have changed. All consumers are
aware of their fairness preferences, also those in the conventional market seg-
ment (tct > 0). Consequently, each firm’s market share is now endogenously
determined by the consumers’ utility function. Consumers buy the conven-
tional (FT) product whenever Uct(x) > (<)Uft(x) and market shares are deter-
mined by the consumer that is indifferent between both products: Uct(x∗) =
Uft(x∗). As before, the market is fully covered, and prices fall sufficiently short
of V to ensure that also the indifferent consumer has positive utility.
Market equilibrium entails market shares of: x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2 and prices
of p∗ct = p∗ft = t + c (for tct = tft ≡ t) The conventional firm’s profits are t/2–F,
of which it transfers zero to smallholders. The FT firm transfers its entire profit
Sft = t/2–F. Note that market shares diverge when tct = tft . For instance, as
illustrated in Figure 3 below, for tct < tft the alternative phase results in a lower
market share for the FT firm than for the conventional firm. With tct (relatively)
low compared to tft , consumers find it less costly to switch to a product con-
taining less wealth transfers than preferred, than to a product containingmore
wealth transfers thanpreferred. This decreases the FT firm’smarket share,while
the FT firm also charges a relatively low price compared to the conventional
firm.
the conventional proﬁt-maximizing monopolist would end up in the middle of its market segment to
serve the whole market. The optimal location for the ﬁrm would then be act = x∗/2, and prices charged
depend on the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay and their psychological distance costs, hence
pct = V − tx∗/2.
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Figure 3. Illustration of the market situation in the alternative phase (for tft > tct).
Total wealth transfers are positively related to t, a result that also appears in
other phases. This outcome arises because we have assumed that consumers’
willingness to pay V is always sufficiently high to ensure that the whole mar-
ket is covered. A high t means that consumers face high costs when buying
a product containing a different amount of wealth transfers than preferred.
However, with only two firms in the market there is not much to choose for
consumers, giving firmsprice-settingpower over consumers in their respective
market segments. As long as the indifferent consumer between both products
experiences nonnegative utility, which will be the case if V is high enough,
firms are thus able to charge higher prices when t goes up. With symmetric
distance costs, this will leave the division of the market unchanged, resulting
in a larger profitmargin for both firms and a higher amount of wealth transfers.
With asymmetric distance cost, changes in ti will also affect profits and wealth
transfers through an impact on markets shares, see Table 1.
A low tct and tft also mean that consumers do not care that much about the
distance costs when being unable to buy products with their most preferred
fairness level. Both products are better substitutes, reducing the price-setting
power of firms, and result in lowprices and lowwealth transfers. A similar effect
occurs if we assume that consumers’ willingness to payV is insufficient to cover
the entiremarket. Parts of themarketwill not be served, resulting in a reduction
of profits and wealth transfers as shown in the Appendix.
3.3. The labeling phase
In the labeling phase, the conventional firm is no longer fixed in its (initial)
location of act = 0. The conventional firm could obtain higher profits moving
upwards on the fairness continuum: its market share would increase by com-
peting in fairness with the FT firm in an integrated FT market. Clearly, this
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also implies that the conventional firm must increase the amount of wealth
transfers from zero to a positive amount, due to the assumed linear relation-
ship between ai and the share of profits going to wealth transfers. The FT firm
remains in its original location of aft = 1.6
Equilibrium entails market shares and prices that depend on the conven-
tional firm’s position on the fairness spectrum: x∗ = 1/2 + act/6 and 1 − x∗ =
1/2 − act/6 and p∗ct = (1 + act/3)t + c and p∗ft = (1 − act/3)t + c. The closer
the conventional firm locates to the FT firm’s position (aft = 1), the higher the
price to be charged. By contrast, the FT firm’s market share and price are under
pressure by the increased competition.
Based on the conventional firm’s profit functions, it would be profitable for
the conventional firm to relocate on the fairness continuum. In fact, with both
the conventional firm’s price andmarket share positively related to its location,
the conventional firmwill find it optimal to relocate towards complete fairness:
a∗ct = 1. Hence, two FT products will be supplied with similar fairness content:
a∗ct = a∗ft = 1. For symmetric distance costs, market shares become x∗ = 2/3
and 1 − x∗ = 1/3 and prices are p∗ct = 4/3t + c and p∗ft = 2/3t + c.
This is not the final outcome of the labeling phase, however. As consumers
are price sensitive (i.e. maximizing their utility), locating at the FT firm’s loca-
tion implies that the conventional firm will lose consumers unless it aligns its
price to that of the FT firm. Assuming that the conventional product’s price
equals theprice the FT firmestablished in the alternativephase – reflecting fair-
ness, the FT firm’s price is part of its strategy and unlikely to change (Jaffee and
Howard 2016) – both firms will end up serving half of the market.7 Nash mar-
ket shares are x∗ = 1 − x∗ = 1/2 and prices are p∗ct = p∗ft = t + c. Total wealth
transfers are t − 2F.
3.4. Themainstream phase
In the duopolistic market situation of our model we assume that the move of
the conventional firm towards the same location induces the FT firm to lower
its price. The FT firm also considers to make concessions regarding its ideo-
logical stance, realizing that the larger public does not want to go as fa(i)r
as the ideologist consumers in the charity phase. This way, the FT firm could
increase its profits to increase the total amount of wealth transfers for the
smallholders. Observing this potential move of the FT firm, the conventional
firm reconsiders its location choice. Thus, now both firms are willing to move
6 In fact, ideology prevented (part of the) FT ﬁrms to move until other ﬁrms started to move in the market
(Nicholls and Opal 2005, Reed 2009).
7 The conventional ﬁrm could consider to lower its price even below that of the FT ﬁrm. This is unrealistic
as it already transfers its entire proﬁts to local smallholders and thus has no real interest in gaining more
market share. Furthermore, the conventional ﬁrm runs a risk of a price war resulting in zero proﬁts when
it cuts its price further. Finally, with the FT becomingmore important, the conventional ﬁrm could expect
that consumers are willing to pay more for ethically produced products.
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along the fairness continuum, intensifying competition in wealth transfers.
Within our model both firms are able to move, choosing prices and locations
simultaneously.
In a situation in which both prices and locations are simultaneously chosen,
no final conclusion can be drawn on firms’ locations unless other assumptions
are made (D’Aspremont et al. 1979, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1986, Lipczynski et
al. 2012). Considering firms’ tendency to move to each other’s location in the
labeling phase, this could result in a return to the original Hotelling outcome
in which firms optimally locate halfway the fairness spectrum (as will be the
case when the psychological distance costs are symmetric). But irrespective of
the exact location both firms share, each firm will have a market share of half.
What happens next depends on the features of the productmarket concerned,
making it useful to differentiate between homogeneous and heterogeneous
products.
Consider first a market for homogeneous products, where consumers are
no longer able to distinguish FT products on fairness. Absent any other fea-
tures differentiating both products, Bertrand competition occurs and prices
decrease until profits are zero (Davenport 2005, Becchetti et al. 2014). Con-
sumer welfare goes up at the expense of smallholders, who do not receive
wealth transfers anymore. This outcome is in line with what has been referred
to as ‘commoditization’, denoting a process by which products (and services)
are becoming more homogeneous for both firms and consumers (Reimann et
al. 2010). Price competition prevails, and no profits can be reaped: FT products
become commodity-like products (Davenport 2005). These issues are beyond
the scope of this paper though.
An additional effect of intensified competition is that cost considerations
become more important for firms (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen 2010). Essen-
tially, firms have two options to become more efficient. First, marginal costs
of operations c could be reduced. If only one of the firms in the commodi-
tized market succeeds in doing so, this will result in a monopoly situation. The
effect on wealth transfers is unclear as such a monopolist will have to choose
between possible reputation damage (by only offering conventional products)
and consumers’ psychological distance costs (offer products containingwealth
transfers). If more firms succeed in reducing their costs c, Bertrand competition
again leads to (close to) marginal cost pricing. Wealth transfers remain zero
and the benefits of lower costs are passed on to consumers, not to smallhold-
ers. Second, firms could start reducing the amount of wealth transfers per se.
With consumers unable to see fairness differences firms have no incentive to
hold on to their original location on the fairness continuum. As a result, firms
could startmoving to a location implying fewerwealth transfers (e.g. Jaffee and
Howard 2010, 2016, Doherty et al. 2013).
In heterogeneous product markets products differ on other aspects than
fairness. Consumers’ psychological distance costs could continue to be
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relevant in such a market. However, the interpretation of tct and tft would
become slightly different, referring to the psychological distance consumers
face with regard to the product itself rather than to fairness. As such, tct > tft
implies that consumers will be more attracted to the FT product for other rea-
sons than fairness, allowing FT firms to charge higher prices (and vice versa
if tct < tft). This makes sense: to make profits when differentiation of FT prod-
ucts on fairness is no longer possible, firms have to seek other ways to attract
consumers and/or influence the consumers’ psychological distance costs (e.g.
Obermiller et al. 2009, Reimann et al. 2010). Firms may add extra product fea-
tures8 or provide extra information, securing differentiation and choice for
consumers.
Also in heterogeneous product markets competition serves to make cost
considerations more important. Higher costs and more pressure on wealth
transfers may result from firms’ desire to differentiate from their competitors
(Hockerts andWüstenhagen 2010). However, the outcomemaybe less gloomy
in heterogeneous markets, particularly because the search for differentiation
also implies a shift of costs towards R&D to find innovative ways of attract-
ing consumers and reaching smallholders. If this happens, both consumers
and smallholders would benefit. Consumers are provided with more FT prod-
uct varieties, as well as possibly lower prices and psychological distance costs.
Smallholders do benefit by more effective wealth transfers.
4. The effect of mainstreaming on wealth transfers
Wenow compare howwealth transfers change over the course ofmainstream-
ing, analyzing changes in the total amount ofwealth transfers, wealth transfers
per firm, and wealth transfers per product sold. The total amount of wealth
transfers per phase is denoted by Sj in which j represents either of the four
phases charity, alternative, labeling, and mainstream. Sji denotes wealth trans-
fers per firm in each phase, and s¯ji the amount of wealth transfer per FT product
sold, calculated as Sji/xi (i = ct, ft; j = phase). Table 2 gives an overview of
our results. As before, we will focus on the case of symmetric psychological
distance costs tct = tft ≡ t.
4.1. Comparing the charity phase with the alternative phase
Comparingwealth transfers between the charity and alternative phase is prob-
lematic because it implies a transition from amonopoly in the charity phase to
a duopoly in the alternative phase. Prices and market shares become subject
to consumers’ choice between the two products, making their stance towards
8 For example, in the Dutch chocolate market ﬁrms have deepened their product assortment by adding
special ﬂavours to their brand to further distinguish themselves from their competitors (for instance, the
Dutch Tony’s Chocolonely and Côte D’Or).
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Table 2. Comparison of wealth transfers between diﬀerent phases of mainstreaming
fairtrade.
Phases Diﬀerences for symmetric t Diﬀerences for asymmetric t
Charity –
Alternative*
n/a n/a
Alternative –
Labeling
Total Salter  Slabel ⇔ t
2
− F  0 Salter  Slabel ⇔ 1
3
(2tct + tft)(
1 − 1
3
2tct + tft
tct + tft
)
− F  0
Firm
Sctalter  Sct label ⇔ t2 − F  0
Sftalter = Sft label
Sctalter  Sct label ⇔ 16 (2tct + tft) − F  0
Sftalter  Sft label ⇔ tct  tft
Per product
s¯ctalter  s¯ct label ⇔ t  2F
s¯ftalter = s¯ft label
s¯ctalter  s¯ct label ⇔ 13 (2tct + tft) − 2F  0
s¯ftalter  s¯ft label ⇔ tct  tft
Labeling –
Mainstream**
Total Slabel  Smain ⇔ 3
4
t − F  0 Slabel  Smain ⇔ 13
24
tct + 524 tft − F  0
Firm
Sct label  Sctmain ⇔ 38 t −
1
2
F  0
Sft label  Sftmain ⇔ 38 t −
1
2
F  0
Sct label  Sctmain ⇔ 13 tct +
1
24
tft − 12 F  0
Sft label  Smainft ⇔
5
24
tct + 16 tft −
1
2
F  0
Per product
s¯ct label  s¯ctmain ⇔ 34 t − F  0
s¯ft label  s¯ftmain ⇔ 34 t − F  0
s¯ct label  s¯ctmain ⇔ 23 tct +
1
12
tft − F  0
s¯ft label  s¯ftmain ⇔ 512 tct +
1
3
tft − F  0
*The structure of these phases is diﬃcult to compare, and as such we have made additional assumptions
as explained in the text.
**We have put here only the results for heterogeneous product markets. As in homogeneous product
markets no proﬁts are generated, wealth transfers are lower in the mainstream phase.
both products important. This carries over to wealth transfers. In the charity
phase, the amount of wealth transfers depends mainly on the exogenously
determined number of consumers ideologically preferring FT products. Com-
bined with consumers’ maximum willingness to pay V and the psychological
distance costs tft , the given market share determines the price level covering
the entire FTmarket segment and thewealth transfers. By contrast, in the alter-
native phase consumers are able to compare both products and also tct starts
playing a role. Market shares and prices are determined by the consumer that
is indifferent in terms of utility between the two products. Wealth transfers can
be expressed to depend on fixed costs F and the psychological distance costs
tft and tct only.
To get some idea how the transition from charity to alternative phaseworks
out for wealth transfers, a useful benchmark is to assume that in the alternative
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phase the market shares of both firms are a half. This would be the case when
the psychological distance costs are symmetric. The price the FT firm charges
is then t + c and wealth transfers are t/2 − F. Suppose furthermore that the
prices charged in thealternativephase are such that theutility of the indifferent
consumer is exactly zero, that is: the maximum willingness to pay is such that
Valter = palterft + t(1 − x∗) = 3/2t + c.
Assume now that also in the charity phase the willingness to pay is exactly
binding. Keepingwillingness to pay equal across phases, this implies that Vchar
is 3/2t + c as well. In terms of Figures 2 and 3: V lies at the exact same level
in both phases. Then, if the exogenous market segment for FT products in the
charity phase is ½ as well, the FT firm charges the same price as in the alter-
native phase to make V exactly binding, making wealth transfers exactly the
same. If, however, the FT market segment in the charity phase is a fraction
0 < δ < 1 of its market share of a half in the alternative phase, the price the
FT firm charges in the charity phase will be higher and wealth transfers will be
smaller: pcharft = (1 + δ/2)t + c and Schar = t/2 − F − (1 + δ)tδ/4.
In the Appendix, we show that this basic outcome also holds for the more
general case of tft = tct . Hence, as long as the FT firm’s market share expands
due to becoming an integrated market, wealth transfers increase. The extent
towhich this occurs depends on the extent of the psychological distance costs:
the lower these are, the lower the impact on wealth transfers will be. For
symmetric distance costs Salter − Schar = (1 + δ)tδ/4 > 0, which becomes less
positive when t decreases.
4.2. Comparing the alternative phase with the labeling phase
Comparing total wealth transfers between the alternative and the labeling
phase is more straightforward since market shares in both phases are deter-
mined in the same fashion. Presenting results in general notation for ease of
reference, we get,
Slabel  Salter ⇔ 1
3
(2tct + tft)
(
1 − 1
3
2tct + tft
tct + tft
)
 F (3)
The main difference between the total wealth transfers in both phases is
the conventional firm’s move to act = 1, implying a market share of one for
FT products in the labeling phase. This is also visible in (3). In the labeling
phase, both firms supply FT products at the FTproduct’s price of the alternative
phase 13 (2tct + tft), the first part of the equation. The difference inwealth trans-
fers thus amounts to a comparison of market shares of FT products between
the two phases, which is 1 − 13 2tct+tfttct+tft > 0, the second part in (3). However,
this positive effect of increased market share on wealth transfers should be
compared to the extra fixed cost F coming alongwhen two firms offer FT prod-
ucts. This inefficiency in the market cannot be prevented unless both firms
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would become one. Such a monopoly position would however result in other
inefficiencies. Note that (3) becomes t/2 − F  0 for symmetric psychologi-
cal distance costs, implying that if firms’ profits are positive, wealth transfers
increase when moving from the alternative phase to the labeling phase.
Additionally, we compare the differences in wealth transfers per firm, con-
tributing to the discussion of the dilution of FT (e.g. Jaffee and Howard 2010).
Do FT firms indeed offer less wealth transfers if competition becomes more
important in the FT market? Comparing Sft
alter and Sft
label , we derive:
Sft
alter  Sftlabel ⇔ tct  tft (4)
The intuition behind (4) is as follows. As soon as tct > tft the FT firm’s mar-
ket share in the alternative phase is larger than FT’s market share of 1/2 in the
labeling phase. The higher the consumers’ psychological fairness costs regard-
ing the conventional product, the more attractive the FT product becomes for
consumers. The higher market share results in larger profits for the FT firm,
making Sft
alter larger in comparison to wealth transfers in the labeling phase.
Likewise, when tct < tft , the FT firm’s market share in the alternative phase is
smaller than in the FT labeling phase, resulting in lower wealth transfers in the
alternative phase. For the conventional firm these considerations do not mat-
ter: as it generated zero wealth transfers in the alternative phase, it obviously
transfers more in the labeling phase.
Also, the effect on average wealth transfers, thewealth transfers per product
sold, add to the discussion on dilution. The conventional firm’s wealth transfers
per product sold increase, while for the FT firmwe find s¯ftalter  s¯ft label ⇔ tct 
tft , due to the interplay of fixed costs and FTmarket shares. As in the alternative
phase, theFT firm’smarket share is larger (smaller)when tct > (<)tft , F is spread
over more (less) products and average wealth transfers increase (decrease)
for the FT firm. As FT market shares were relatively small, it is likely that the
labeling phase thus results in higher average wealth transfers for the FT firm.
Furthermore, it indicates a more efficient provision of wealth transfers by the
FT firm.
4.3. Comparing the labeling phase with themainstream phase
We now analyze the differences between the labeling phase and the main-
stream phase, the latter being featured by either homogeneous or heteroge-
neous products. If firms cannot differentiate, this leads to commoditization of
FT products and zero wealth transfers. If firms can differentiate their products
sufficiently to ensure prices abovemarginal costs, andpositivewealth transfers
can be generated.
When the mainstream phase implies homogeneous products, we have
seen that prices are reduced towards marginal costs, rendering the psy-
chological distance costs ti irrelevant. Wealth transfers are zero, resulting in
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Smain < Slabel ⇔ 13 (2tct + tft) − 2F > 0. Similar results followwhen comparing
wealth transfers per firm Sij and per FT product sold s¯i j. The condition implies
that the amount of wealth transfers generated in a mainstream market with
homogeneous products is smaller as long as wealth transfers in the labeling
phase are positive. This must be the case, unless themarket is too small to sus-
tain two firms (the left-hand side of the condition equals profits in the labeling
phase).
A slightly different picture emerges if the mainstream phase involves het-
erogeneous products, allowing firms tomake positive profits. Comparing total
amounts of wealth transfers yields
Slabel  Smain ⇔ 13
24
tct + 524 tft  F (5)
where tct and tft mark the extent of differentiation of the conventional firms
and FT firms, respectively. When both firms differentiate equally (tct = tft = t),
the condition reduces to 34 t  F. As market shares are equal in both phases
(equal to 1/2), price differences explain the left-hand side of (5). In the label-
ing phase, the mark-up over marginal costs is 13 (2tct + tft) for both firms,
while in the mainstream phase it is tft/2 for the conventional firm and tct/2
for the FT firm. If it were for the difference in prices alone, wealth transfers
would thus be higher in the labeling phase. However, in themainstreamphase
firms donate 50% of their profits, rather than 100% in the labeling phase. This
implies that the effect on total wealth transfers of having double fixed costs
in the market are also halved. Ceteris paribus prices, in the labeling phase
wealth transfers are therefore lower by a factor F, explaining the right-hand
side of (5).
Linking (5) to our assumption that in the labeling phase the conventional
firm makes a positive profit, hence: 16 (2tct + tft) > F, wealth transfers will be
definitely lower in themainstream phase when ti remains equal across phases.
If wewould assume ti to become lower throughout the process ofmainstream-
ing FT, for instance, due to commoditization, wealth transfers would become
even lower. Hence, in the heterogeneous case,wealth transfers to smallholders
declines when the mainstreaming of FT reaches its final phase.
Similar conclusions can be drawnwhen comparing the wealth transfers per
firm or per product sold. For the wealth transfers per firm we obtain (6) and
(7):9
Sct
label  Sctmain ⇔ 13 tct +
1
24
tft 
1
2
F (6)
Sft
label  Sftmain ⇔
5
24
tct + 16 tft 
1
2
F (7)
9 The results for wealth transfers per product sold are obtained by dividing both sides of the conditions
by ½.
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These conditions reduce to 3/4t  F for tct = tft = t. Hence, while dilution
takes place in the mainstream phase in the sense that both firms move to
a lower position on the fairness continuum, whether or not this also implies
lower wealth transfers per firm or per product sold is conditional on (6) and (7).
5. Discussion and conclusion
We have analyzed the consequences of fair trade mainstreaming for wealth
transfers to small local producers (smallholders) in developing countries
during four historically relevant phases, showing how competition and
profit-maximization conflict with compliance with ethical principles. Using a
Hotelling model of spatial competition, we show that mainstreaming could
have a negative effect on compliance with ethical standards, resulting in lower
wealth transfers to smallholders. Price competition and market share pressure
could however also induce (fair trade) firms to become more efficient and
innovative in wealth transfer provision. Finally, competition could imply that
differentiating on fairness becomes subordinate to differentiating on other
product features also for ideologically-driven firms like ATOs.
These effects become already visible in the ‘alternative’ phase of main-
streaming, when ideology-driven fair trade firms fully comply, yet have to
compete with conventional firms for market share. In the labeling phase, the
conventional firm strategically moves towards the fair trade firm’s location,
increasing total wealth transfers. However, average wealth transfers could be
lower depending on fair trade’s market share in the alternative phase. In the
mainstreamphase, also the fair trade firm starts to think competitively, making
compromises towards compliance. Furthermore, to retainmarket share the fair
trade firm lowers its price. The definite effect on wealth transfers in the main-
streamphase is unclear. Cost reduction strategies and increased competition in
fairness can induce firms to differentiate their products on other aspects than
fairness. If firms are unable to do so, the process of commoditization sets in,
implying less wealth transfers. If, by contrast, fair trade firms can differentiate
on other attributes than fairness, prospects are less gloomy because it allows
firms to generate wealth transfers nevertheless. For instance, fair trade prod-
ucts may successfully be differentiated and positioned on taste and/or quality
(Obermiller et al. 2009, Bezençon and Blili 2011). Competitive pressure on cost
reduction is then less prevalent, as firms have incentives to find new ways of
attracting consumers. For consumers, however, as soon as fair trade product
differentiation increases, fairness will be difficult to understand (Walton 2010,
McArdle and Thomas 2012, Hilson et al. 2016). At the same time, more fair
tradeproducers canbe reached, benefiting fromqualitatively improvedwealth
transfers.
The findings of our modeling framework relate well to reality. In the label-
ing phase and the mainstreaming phase fair trade’s sales increased, making
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fair trade firms more cost-efficient. At the same time, however, conventional
firmswere attracted to participate: aligningwith a labeling body implied lower
costs (e.g. Golan et al. 2001). The increased competition caused some fair trade
firms to go bankrupt in the 1990s while those surviving were reported to have
had higher sales (Nicholls and Opal 2005). Fair trade firms starting to deliver
less than a 100% fair trade-certified products is also the reason for the split
in the US movement in 2011 (Jaffee and Howard 2016). These are all signs
that ‘commoditization’ is a real-world issue (e.g. Reimann et al. 2010), giving
rise to tensions between ideology-driven and market-driven fair trade firms in
whichdifferentiationbecomesakey issue if ideology-driven firmsare to survive
(Obermiller et al. 2009, Bezençon 2011).
Our model contributes to the scholarly literature in different ways. First,
it shows that in the process of increasing competition in ethical standards,
firms find themselves in a continuous battle for market share, culminating
into incentives to lower costs and/or to differentiate their products. This sup-
ports the view of some ATOs arguing that mainstreaming leads to a lower
compliance with fair trade standards, ‘diluting’ the original fair trade concept
particularly in the competitive, last phase of mainstreaming. However, to sur-
vive, firms initially focusing on ‘original’ fairness principles are to becomemore
compliant regarding new ideas on fairness in the market. If especially in the
mainstream phase ATOs start to diversify and innovate, consumers remain
attracted.Althoughchanges in theoriginal fair trade conceptmaybe the result,
this could result in survival of ATOs, and higher total wealth transfers nonethe-
less (e.g. Jaffee andHoward 2016).Moreover, it could result in further reflection
on what ‘fairness’ is in a context of increasing competition, and find ways to
eliminate current perceived imbalances in the fair trade system (e.g. Bacon
2010, Besky 2015). For instance, fair trade standards are sometimes considered
too ‘Northern’, i.e. ATOs and for-profit firms will need to actively involve small-
holders in standard establishment and implementation (e.g. Bezençon 2011,
McArdle and Thomas 2012). This may become even a (welcome) differenti-
ation fair trade product strategy in Western markets (e.g. Bezençon and Blili
2011).
Second, we applied a modeling framework integrating key developments
in fair trademarkets, providing a consistent treatment of the consequences for
wealth transfers of moving from a fairness-driven charitable consumer move-
ment to a market-oriented supplier movement. Such formal and integrated
framework on the role of competition in mainstreaming fair trade is typically
lacking in the fair trade literature on ‘dilution’ of (ethical) standards. Like-
wise, our modeling framework facilitates analyzing what changed consumers’
stances towards fair trade would imply for wealth transfers. For instance, if in
either the labeling phase or mainstream phase consumers become less reluc-
tant to buy fair trade products, implying a decline of the psychological costs of
buying a fair trade product over time, this is good news for the fair trade firm
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as it raises its competitiveness.10 The catch is that conventional firms also get
an additional incentive tomove to a higher fairness location. However, as long
as fair trade does not enter themainstreamphase, increased competition does
not lower overall wealth transfers.
Third, our model also contributes to the literature highlighting how the
competition mechanism affects the fairness of fair trade (Maseland and De
Vaal 2002, Walton 2010). Particularly, it yields insight in whether the diver-
gent strategies of the two main perspectives in the fair trade movement can
be successful, i.e. reaching the movement’s goals by focusing on its original,
ideological principles or by full compliance with standards focusing on a ‘stan-
dards market’ (e.g. Reinecke et al. 2012). As for the latter, our analysis suggests
having a joint ethical standard in industries which may guarantee a certain
(minimum) level of wealth transfers, as ourmodel suggests that such an ethical
standard is to bepreferred overmarket competition, especially if the process of
commoditization starts (e.g. Davenport 2005). Building on the suggestions of
Bezençon (2011), debates ondifferences betweenATOs and fair trade-certifiers
may become a strength forcing both sides to focus and cooperate on making
impact for beneficiaries and draw away a too rigid focus on the compliance
of principles. Context-specific impact studies of fair trade mainstream actors
and ATOs (e.g. Low and Davenport 2006, Doherty et al. 2013, Ingenbleek and
Reinders 2013) are required to analyze how such cooperation affects market
structure, market shares and prices with information on wealth transfers to
producers, i.e. fairness (Ronchi 2006, McArdle and Thomas 2012, Bassett 2014).
Despite these contributions of our modeling approach, various limitations
exist. For instance, we have assumed that consumers have perfect information
on their fairness preferences and firms’ wealth transfers, as well as that con-
sumers are evenly spreadover the fairness continuum. These assumptionsmay
not hold in practice, however. With fair trade being a ‘credence good’, infor-
mation asymmetries exist regarding the true provision of wealth transfers, i.e.
firms’ location (cf. Mohan 2009, Balineau andDufeu 2010).Moreover, notmuch
is known about consumer psychological distance costs regarding fair trade
(BasuandHicks 2008).More informationmay lower these costs, however, could
also result in cognitive overload, particularly if the number of fair trade labels
increases and products become more identical (Golan et al. 2001, Sénéchal et
al. 2014). Finally, we argue that our model does not take a stance regarding
the fairness of the fair trade system and the overall viability of its market oper-
ations (e.g. Hira and Ferrie 2006, Bacon 2010, Walton 2010). Nevertheless, we
believe that the integration of historical developments of ethical standards in
a model with competitive market interactions provides worthwhile insights in
10 Hardly any research has focused on the eﬀects of increased competition among fair trade products
on consumers’ psychological distance costs. Exceptions are Yamoah et al. (2016) and Sénéchal et al.
(2014). Such investigations would further enhance our understanding of the eﬀects on wealth transfers
to smallholders.
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how for-profit and ideologically-driven firms behave and what this implies for
those for whom these ethical standards are introduced in the first place: the
local fair trade producers.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivations Nash equilibria
Charity phase: In the charity phase the market segments are exogenously given by,
respectively, x∗ and (1 − x∗) for the conventional firm and the FT firm. Each firm
acts as a monopolist in its respective market segment, setting prices such that the
market segment is exactly covered. Applying (2) this gives p∗ct = V and p∗ft = V −
(1 − x∗)tft . Best-response functions are redundant in this phase and by (1) firms’
profits are: π∗ct = (V − c)x∗ − F and π∗ft = (V − (1 − x∗)tft − c)(1 − x∗) − F. Wealth
transfers in this phase are equal to the entire FT firm’s profits: Schar = Sft = π∗ft =
(V − (1 − x∗)tft − c)(1 − x∗) − F.
All other phases: Within all other phases (alternative, labeling, mainstream) mar-
ket shares are endogenously determined by the consumer who is exactly indifferent
betweenbothgoods in termsof utility. Hence,Uct(x∗) = Uft(x∗)determines thedivision
of themarket between the conventional firm (market share x∗) and the FT firm (market
share 1 − x∗) as a function of both firms’ prices and fairness locations, allowing the con-
struction of best-response-curves and the determination of theNash-equilibriumprices
and market shares. The outcomes are depicted in Table A.1 below. Filling in the values
for act and aft that hold for the specific phase yields the results that are reported in the
main text.
Table A1. Overview of outcomes.
Conventional ﬁrm FT ﬁrm
Market share functions x∗ = pft−pct+aft tft+act tcttct+tft 1 − x∗ =
pct−pft+(1−aft)tft+(1−act)tct
tct+tft
Best response functions pct = pft+act tct+aft tft+c2 pft = pct+(1−act)tct+(1−aft)tft+c2
Nash prices p∗ct = 13 (tct + tft + acttct + afttft) + c p∗ft = 13 (2tct + 2tft − acttct−afttft)+c
Nash market shares x∗ = 13 tct+tft+act tct+aft tfttct+tft 1 − x∗ =
1
3
2tct+2tft−act tct−aft tft
tct+tft
Nash proﬁts π∗ct = 19(tct+tft) (tct + tft + acttct π∗ft =
1
9(tct+tft) (2tct + 2tft
+afttft)2 − F −acttct − afttft)2 − F
A.2 Optimal location
The outcomes for the optimal fairness location for the conventional firm in the labeling
phase follow from
∂πct
∂act
= 2
9
tct(tct + 2tft + acttct)
(tct + tft)
> 0;
∂2πct
∂2act
= 4
9
t2ct
(tct + tft)
> 0,
implying a corner solution at act = 1. Ethical minimal differentiation at ai = 1 results,
with consequences as reported in the main text.
Likewise, for themainstreaming phase, we derive:
∂π∗ct
∂act
= 2tct
9(tct + tft)
(tct + tft + acttct + afttft)
∂π∗ft
∂aft
= 2tft
9(tct + tft)
(2tct + 2tft − acttct − afttft)
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 31
showing that a single solution in optimal locations cannot be established. As we argue,
the Hotelling outcome will be most likely the result, resulting in ethical minimum
differentiation at ai = 1/2.
A.3 Consequences of binding V
In ourmodelwehave (implicitly) assumed that consumers’willingness topayV is always
sufficiently high to cover the whole market, given the psychological distance costs ti
and prices pi . If this is not the case, gaps in the market could arise. Here we analyze this
possibility for the mainstream phase, framing it as the result of a situation where firms
make a wrong assessment of consumers’ willingness to pay, for instance because they
are overoptimistic regarding V , expecting a higher V than it actually is: Ve > V (with Ve
denoting the firm’s expectations regarding the willingness to pay and V its actual value
which is unknown to the firm).
Being located in the middle of the fairness continuum in the mainstream phase, by
the consumer’s utility function a firm would expect a market share of xe = (Ve − pi)/ti
(i = ct, ft). The market share it actually gets is however determined by the actual V : x =
(V − pi)/ti . Hence, if Ve > V themarketwill not be served completely and the change in
market share isxi = (V − Ve)/ti < 0, ceteris paribus the firm’s price. The concomitant
changes in profits andwealth transfers are, respectively,πi = (V − Ve)(p∗i − c)/ti < 0
and Si = (V − Ve)(p∗i − c)/2ti < 0. The market loss implies that for the FT firm, the
consumerswith thehighest FTpreferences are lost, whereas the conventional firm loses
the consumerswith the lowest fairness preferences. In fact, thus two newmarket niches
are created, in which new firms could enter.
A.4 Comparingwealth transfer between charity phase and alternative
phase
To compare wealth transfers between the charity phase with exogenous market seg-
ments and the alternative phase with endogenous markets shares, we set V as a
constraint to the maximum prices for both phases:
Vchar = Valter ⇔ pcharft + tft(1 − x∗,char) =
1
3
(2tct + tft) + tft
(
1
3
2tct + tft
tct + tft
)
where the right-hand side of this equation represents palterft − c + tft(1 − x∗,alter).
Assume that Vchar is exactly binding aswell. Furthermore, assume that the FTmarket
segment in the charity phase is a fraction 0 < δ < 1 lower than in the alternative phase.
This implies pcharft = Valter − tft(1 − δ)(1 − x∗,alter) and hence, substituting for Valter and
(1 − x∗,alter):
pcharft =
1
3
(2tct + tft) + c + δtft
(
1
3
2tct + tft
tct + tft
)
.
Wealth transfers are Schar = (pcharft − c)(1 − δ)(1 − x∗,alter) − F. Substituting for pcharft
and (1 − x∗,alter) yields, after rearranging:
Schar =
[
1
9
(2tct + tft)2
(tct + tft)
− F
]
− δ
9
(2tct + tft)2
(tct + tft)2
(tct + δtft).
Since the first term on the right-hand side equals the wealth transfers in the alterna-
tive phase, it is clear that Schar < Salter as long as the FT market segment is lower than
the FT firm’s market share in the alternative phase.
